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I. INTRODUCTION
In its most simple form, negligent misrepresentation allows for recovery
of pecuniary loss resulting from reliance on a false statement made by a party
who acted unreasonably in not ascertaining the truth." Courts developed the
doctrine in order to provide a remedy for pecuniary injuries which were not
covered by tort law or contract law.2 Historically, courts recognized that re-
covery of pecuniary loss in a tort action was limited by the negligence concept
of "privity" of contract.3 Likewise, recovery for fraud and deceit in contract
1. The author proposes this definition of negligent misrepresentation without
reference to any standard explanations or formulations of the theory. It is far too sim-
pie to be reliable in that many factors must be satisfied before liability will be imposed.
These factors will be discussed subsequently, but this definition will suffice as a starting
point.
2. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWENS, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS, § 92 at 655 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER &
KEETON].
3. Id. § 93 at 667; see also Roddy v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 234, 15
S.W. 1112 (1891) (employee of quarry owner injured by negligence of railroad, but
1
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actions was limited to situations in which misrepresentation is a hybrid theory
of recovery which developed as a result of these tort and contract limitations.
These divergent and sometimes conflicting bases for liability have caused
much confusion in defining and limiting the scope of negligent misrepresenta-
tion.4 Ultimately, the negligent misrepresentation action served as a transition
between negligence and fraud actions.5
Missouri is currently in the process of adopting section 552 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.6 Section 552 attempts to formulate a coherent,
unified cause of action for negligent misrepresentation out of the jumble of
case law that existed at the fringes of negligence and fraud. The inevitable
friction that emerges when two theoretically separate legal frameworks overlap
results in some troubling questions that have not yet been answered adequately
by the courts. 7 Because of the difficulty in placing negligent misrepresentation
on a firm analytical footing, both practitioners and judges have been unwilling
to rely on the concept as the basis of their arguments or holdings.8 As a result,
denied cause of action because no privity). But see Carter v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 139
S.W.2d 1025 (Mo. App., St. L. 1940) (privity not required where implied warranty
shown). The classic formulation of the privity requirement can be found in the English
case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). In
Winterbottom, the passenger of a public coach sustained injuries due to negligent
maintenance of the coach. The court limited coverage to those parties in privity of
contract with the maintenance company; the court denied the passenger a cause of
action. Id. at 110, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403.
4. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 107, at 740-41. It was not until as late
as 1889 that the House of Lords, in the leading case of Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337(1880), clearly identified the deceit action with intentional misrepresentation and left
negligence and strict liability to be dealt with by other remedies.
5. To illustrate, recovery of intangible economic losses such as lost profits is
generally the domain of contract law. However, if the contract is silent and injuries
result that could have been avoided through the exercise of due care, courts have nor-
mally been willing to invoke negligent misrepresentation to compensate the victim. See,
e.g., Hart v. Ed-Ley Corp., 482 P.2d 421 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); McAfee v. Rockford
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 40 II. App. 3d 521, 352 N.E.2d 50 (1976); Nevada Nat'l
Bank v. Gold Star Meat Co., 89 Nev. 427, 514 P.2d 651 (1973).
6. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text for content of that section and
notes 88-107 and accompanying text for Missouri cases applying section 552.
7. The most basic problem is whether negligent misrepresentation comprises a
single tort or two separate torts that occasionally share the same name. Recent Mis-
souri decisions have attempted to characterize negligent misrepresentation as one uni-
fied tort covering a range of situations. See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
8. Of the seven appellate cases in Missouri that have dealt witfi § 552 and the
tort of negligent misrepresentation, only two have stated that a cause of action based
on the tort was properly pleaded and only one has upheld an actual jury verdict in
favor of a plaintiff with a cause of action based on § 552. See Huttegger v. Davis, 599
S.W.2d 506, 510-11 (Mo. 1980) (recognizing negligent misrepresentation in dicta);
Westerhold v. Carrol, 419 S.W.2d 73, 76-80 (Mo. 1967) (court rejects privity barrier
and cites cases used as foundation for section 552); Chubb Group of Insurance Cos. v.
C.F. Murphy & Assocs., 656 S.W.2d 766, 785 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983) (negligent mis-
representation cause of action properly pleaded); Springdale Gardens, Inc. v. Country-
land Dev., 638 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982) (recognizing negligent misrep-
[Vol. 50
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NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
there is an amazing lack of Missouri case law to illuminate the crevasse that
exists between negligence and fraud.9 This Comment will describe the develop-
ment of negligent misrepresentation from both of its theoretical bases. It will
assess the present status of the cause of action in Missouri and point to key
questions that remain to be answered. Finally, it will propose answers to those
questions based on legal theory and the manner in which other jurisdictions
have addressed them.
10
II. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AS AN ADAPTATION OF NEGLIGENCE
LAW
Prior to 1922, in order to recover for harm negligently inflicted upon an
intangible economic interest, a plaintiff had to show privity of contract with
the negligent party." A contract was necessary to give rise to a duty of due
care. Most courts evidently felt that pecuniary losses were of a class less wor-
thy of protection than physical damage or personal injuries.' 2 Thus courts
were unwilling to find a compensable injury every time a party lost money
resulting from a relationship in which another party failed to meet the stan-
dards of a reasonable man.
In 1922, the New York Court of Appeals, in the landmark case of
Glanzer v. Shepard,"a permitted recovery for economic loss notwithstanding
resentation but reversed on other grounds); Ligon Specialized Hauler v. Inland
Container Corp., 581 S.W.2d 906, 908-09 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (court reinstated
jury verdict in favor of plaintiff with cause of action based on § 552); J. Louis Crum
Corp. v. Alfred Lindgren, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 544, 550-51 (Mo. App., W.D. 1978) (rec-
ognizing negligent misrepresentation in dicta); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox &
Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Mo. App., St. L. 1973) (court cites § 552 for support for
extending tort third party beneficiary doctrine).
9. The 1984 editions of West's Missouri Digest 2d list no cases under the
fraud subsection relating to constructive fraud. Constructive fraud is the category of
cases that manage to avoid the intent requirement for one reason or another. Tradition-
ally, the existence of a fiduciary relationship was often relied on to impose fraud liabil-
ity on a negligent party. The relationship imposed a duty of due care absent an express
contract. See White v. Mulvania, 575 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Mo. 1978) (en banc). As will
be seen subsequently, these cases do have a direct bearing on negligent misrepresenta-
tion where the fiduciary relationship arises in a business transaction. See infra notes
113-23 and accompanying text.
10. This Comment is not intended to be a complete study of negligent misrepre-
sentation in other jurisdictions. Some states have recognized the tort for almost 100
years. See, e.g., Houston v. Thornton, 122 N.C. 365, 29 S.E. 827 (1898). Those states'
case law is voluminous and often not particularly enlightening. Since Missouri appears
to be limiting its cause of action to § 552 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
special attention will be paid to those states which have specifically adopted that sec-
tion or a cause of action very similar thereto. Such cases should be persuasive authority
to Missouri courts as they begin to flesh out the tort as it will apply in this state.
11. See Note, Negligent Misrepresentation-Liability of Accountants to Third
Parties-The .Privity Requirement, 39 Mo. L. REV. 466, 467 (1974).
12. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 92, at 657.
13. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
1985]
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the lack of privity between the parties.14 In Glanzer, the seller of beans had
them weighed by the defendant, a public weigher, who issued a certificate as
to their weight, knowing that a subsequent buyer would pay on the faith of the
certificate. The weigher negligently overstated the weight to the purchaser's
damage.15 Judge Cardozo fixed liability upon the basis of a duty imposed by
law arising out of the contractual relationship of the parties, indicating that
diligence was owed "not only to him who ordered, but to him also who re-
lied."1 6 Cardozo found that the very "end and aim" of the weighing was to
shape the conduct of another. Under the circumstances "assumption of the
task of weighing was the assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the bene-
fit of all whose conduct was to be governed."' 7
Glanzer marked the beginning of the end of the privity barrier in negli-
gence law. As the concept of privity was eroded, courts tested new theories of
potential liability under Cardozo's reasoning. Courts following Glanzer ex-
panded its concepts with judicial zeal. 8 Only nine years after Glanzer, Judge
Cardozo attempted to restrain the runaway impact of his earlier decision. In
Ultrameres Corporation v. Touche,'9 the defendant was a public accounting
firm employed to make an audit and produce a balance sheet for Fred Stern &
Co. The accounting firm made the audit negligently and incorrectly certified
on the balance sheet that capital and surplus were intact, when in fact, the
company was insolvent.20 Fred Stern & Co. approached plaintiff for a loan
which was granted on the strength of the erroneous balance sheet supplied by
the defendant. 21
Cardozo found that the accounting firm could be held responsible for
fraud but rejected liability for ordinary negligence. 2 He reasoned that the
duty of due care toward third parties must be limited in some manner 3 and
14. Id. at 238, 135 N.E. at 277.
15. Id. at 238, 135 N.E. at 275. The certificate misstated the proper weight by
11,854 pounds. Id. at 238, 135 N.E. at 275.
16. Id. at 242, 135 N.E. at 277.
17. Id. at 239, 135 N.E. at 275-76.
18. See, e.g., Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 379-80,
171 N.E. 574, 577 (1930) (bank trustee held liable to all good faith purchasers for
negligently certifying corporate bonds); Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243
N.Y. 458, 465, 154 N.E. 309, 311 (1926) (manufacturer liable for negligently misla-
beling food).
19. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
20. Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 442-43.
21. Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 443.
22. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
23. Id. at 180-81, 174 N.E. at 444. Cardozo stated:
A different question develops when we ask whether they owed a duty to
[creditors and investors] to make it without negligence. If liability for negli-
gence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or
forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeter-
minate class. . . . [L]iability for negligence is one that is bounded by the
880 [Vol. 50
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held that privity, or a bond so close as to approach privity, is essential to im-
pose liability upon the public accountant.24 In essence, the decision restricted
the duty of due care to a relatively small and definable class of parties that
might conceivably rely on the information to their detriment. This distinction
was artificial and somewhat unworkable. It was often criticized25 and has now
been all but abandoned.26
By the time Missouri addressed the privity issue, it was fairly weil settled
that the extension of negligence liability to third parties in economic loss cases
hinged on a balancing of several factors.27 In Westerhold v. Carrol,2s an archi-
tect incorrectly certified the amount of material furnished and the amount of
labor performed in the construction of a church. The owner of the building
paid the contractor in accordance with the percentage of work the defendant
architect certified as being completed. The contractor subsequently defaulted
on the construction contract and the plaintiff, as the contractor's surety, was
obligated to complete the job. 9 Because the defendant had greatly overesti-
mated the amount of work the contractor had completed, the surety was obli-
gated to expend large sums in order to complete the job.30 The surety sued the
architect for the loss resulting from his negligence.
The Missouri Supreme Court found that the surety had a right to rely on
the contract between the defendant architect and the owner to the extent that
the contract obligated the defendant to scrutinize the amount of work the con-
contract, and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract has
been made.
Id. at 179, 189, 174 N.E. at 444, 448.
24. Id. at 185, 174 N.E. at 446.
25. See Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42
HARV. L. REv. 733 (1929).
26. Cardozo himself admitted that "[t]he assault upon the citadel of privity is
proceeding in these days apace." Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445. He
warned that if liability absent privity were not arrested, it would extend to lawyers and
title insurers. He indicated that these examples "may seem to be extreme," but would,
in fact, result from the position asserted by plaintiff in Ultramares, carried to its logical
conclusion. Id. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448. Cardozo's insight proved correct even though
his logic has been dissected and ignored. See, e.g., Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong &
Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1928) (banker liable for negli-
gently issuing letter of credit); International Prod. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155
N.E. 662 (1927) (railroad liable for negligently misinforming importer of warehouse
location). It is now generally accepted that lawyers and title insurers are prime candi-
dates for application of the doctrine of negligent misrepresentation. See e.g., Biakanja
v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (lawyer); Neff v. Bud Lewis Co., 89
N.M. 145, 548 P.2d 107 (1976) (real estate broker).
27. See Masters, Negligence and Economic Loss, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 231, 237(1982); Note, Accountant's Liability for Negligence, 12 CAP. U. L. REv. 327 (1982);
Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 1363 § 2 (1959).
28. 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967).
29. Id. at 74-75.
30. Id. at 75. The surety was forced to spend $93,234.23. An indemnification
agreement obligated the plaintiff to pay $17,500.00 of that amount. Id. at 76.
1985]
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tractor performed so that the owner could pay accordingly.3 1 Therefore, it was
reasonable to assume that the surety would not have agreed to cover the con-
tractor were it not for the supervision obligations of the architect.32 The court
held that the determination of whether a defendant will be held liable on a
contract to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the
balancing of various factors. Factors to be considered include the extent to
which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of
harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,
the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy
of preventing future harm.
33
In 1973, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District ruled on
a case with facts similar to those in Ultrameres. In Aluma Kraft Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co.,3" the court held that where a buyer of shares of
stock relies on a negligently performed audit in determining the book value of
that stock, a cause of action lies against the accounting firm for resulting eco-
nomic loss.35 The court found nothing in the balancing factors set forth in
Westerhold that precluded liability in Aluma Kraft.3 6 What was important
was that the defendant was aware that the information it supplied would be
relied on by a known class of persons. It was not crucial that the accountants
be able to identify a particular plaintiff. It was enough that the plaintiff was
from a class that might reasonably rely on the information supplied by the
defendant.3 7
The court found support for its reasoning in the tentative draft of section
552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.38 Additionally, the court looked to
cases from other jurisdictions that served as the foundation for section 552.11
The court correctly characterized the scope of section 552 when it noted that
"[tihese cases and the Restatement of the Law extend liability to third parties
for whose benefit and guidance the accountant supplies the information, or to
such third persons, although not identified, who the accountant knows the re-
cipient of the audit intends to supply such information.' 0
The theory underlying application of liability to public suppliers of infor-
31. Id. at 80.
32. Id. at 80-81.
33. Id. at 81.
34. 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App., St. L. 1973).
35. Id. at 385.
36. Id. at 383.
37. Id.
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1964);
see also infra notes 74-87.
39. See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yauner &
Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85
(D.R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Shatterproof Glass
Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
40. Aluma Kraft, 493 S.W.2d at 383.
[Vol. 50
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mation is based on the fact that such parties hold themselves out as reliable.41
Public suppliers of information are not in a relationship adverse to either of
the contracting parties."2 Both parties to the contract expect due care from
professionals who have no reason to supply false information to them. Such
professionals exist because parties to business transactions need reliable infor-
mation on which to base their business decisions. 3 Thus business necessity
creates a valid basis for the extension of negligence liability for pecuniary
losses to parties not in privity of contract. This development in third party
beneficiary law applied to negligence principles nurtured the first root in the
development of negligent misrepresentation.
III. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AS AN ADAPTATION OF THE LAW OF
FRAUD
The courts have long relied on the concept of fraud to remedy a plaintiff's
resultant pecuniary losses. A cause of action for intentional misrepresentation
causing pecuniary damage has existed since early English law.4 The intent
requirement in fraud has long been satisfied by actual knowledge of the falsity
of the representation or by willful and wanton conduct amounting to reckless-
ness regarding the falsity of the representation. 45
As the law of fraud developed, courts began to recognize the hardships
encountered by plaintiffs who were victims of misinformation despite the fact
that a defendant-seller may not have intended to defraud the plaintiff. Ini-
tially, courts of equity granted a remedy by rescinding contracts, based on a
misrepresentation even absent an intent to defraud.4 Today, rescission of con-
41. See Burger, Negligent Misrepresentation: A New Trap for the Unwary?, 27
LOYOLA L. REV. 1184, 1187 (1981). The degree to which one is justified in relying on
information is determined by the type of information related.
42. In cases of dual agency, the supplier of information is deemed by law to be
acting as agent for each of two adverse principles. The development of law relating to
dual agency in the case of real estate agents for example is similar to the development
of law relating to professional suppliers of information in the area of negligent misrep-
resentation. See, e.g., Harry M. Fine Realty Co. v. Stiers, 326 S.W.2d 392, 398 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1959) (real estate agent acting for two principals has fiduciary duty to
avoid negligence towards both).
43. See Note, supra note 11, at 467. Courts have imposed § 552 liability
against information suppliers from a variety of backgrounds. Among those professions
that most often fall within § 552 are abstractors, accountants, architects, contractors,
developers, engineers, and surveyors. See infra note 117. For a discussion of the treat-
ment of professionals in most of these areas see Probert, Negligence and Economic
Damage: The California-Florida Nexus, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 485 (1981).
44 The writ of deceit was recognized as early as 1201 in England. 1 L. STREET,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 375 (1906).
45. See Dunn v. White, 63 Mo. 181, 186 (1876) (early statement of Missouri
law).
46. See, e.g., Osterberger v. Hites Constr. Co., 599 S.W.2d 221, 227-29 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1980) (discussion of the continued validity of rescission absent proof of
intent although constructive intent present).
1985]
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tracts for the sale of personalty is a widely accepted practice in the majority of
states.4 7 Rescission of contracts for the sale of property is less widespread but
still significant.
48
Recognizing that rescission was not always an adequate remedy, courts
have devised legal fictions to impose liability in unintentional misrepresenta-
tion cases. Some jurisdictions impute certain knowledge to a seller even though
he is without actual knowledge. 49 Other jurisdictions, like Missouri, permit
liability for false statements without actual knowledge of their truth or fal-
sity."0 In effect, these states impose a duty to discover the truth before making
any statement that. might justifiably be relied on by the buyer. Such methods
of extending the intent requirement are most often referred to as "construc-
tive" fraud.5 The intent presumed by constructive fraud applies to both "neg-
ligent" and "innocent" misrepresentations. Effectively, a seller of goods or
property is held to a strict liability standard for statements made to a pur-
chaser.5 2 In theory, the bounds of application of constructive fraud are limited
only by the reasonableness of the listener in relying on the statements. 3
Arguably, Missouri courts never intended the fraudulent intent require-
ment to extend beyond the realm of recklessness. In fact, much of this state's
case law rejects the idea of strict responsibility for negligent misrepresenta-
47. The remedy is largely statutory in that it is codified in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.), a formulation of which all 50 states have adopted. The U.C.C.
is generally regarded as the exclusive source for ascertaining the remedies to which a
seller is subject if the claim is based on intangible economic loss not attributable to
physical injury or harm. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 (express warranty), 2-314 (implied war-
ranty of merchantability), 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)
(1977); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 95, at 680.
48. Osterberger, 599 S.W.2d at 225 (request for rescission of land sales
contract).
49. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 716, 571 P.2d 769, 776 (1977)
(overruled on other grounds, Owen v. Boydstun, 102 Idaho 31, -, 624 P.2d 413, 418
(1981)) (landowner/seller is presumed to know correct number of acres and character-
istics of land even though he is in fact without that knowledge).
50. See, e.g., White v. Superior Trailer Sales, 605 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Mo. App.,
W.D. 1980) (misrepresentations involving the sale of a truck were actionable where
"consciously and reckless" made).
51. See 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 4 (1983).
52. The drafters of the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTS realized that strict
responsibility for innocent misrepresentations falls within the same general category as
negligent misrepresentations. Accordingly, they incorporated a provision in § 552 to
limit recovery of damages to situations involving sales, rentals, or exchange transac-
tions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (1981).
53. See, e.g., Vochatzer v. Public Water Supply Dist. Number 1, 637 S.W.2d
418, 420 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982) (water user had no right to rely on statement by city
that water would be available). The "right to rely" is a separate element that must be
proven to establish fraud. The concept limits a buyer's claim of reliance on statements
that are not outrageous or beyond the scope of belief of a reasonable man. By contrast,
the concept of "puffing," or making representations in a sales context that would not be
relied upon by a reasonable buyer, is still alive and well in the case law. See, e.g.,
Strebler v. Rixman, 616 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
[Vol. 50
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tions." In adopting the constructive intent concept, Missouri courts have im-
posed liability only for conscious lack of knowledge. 55 Several cases stated the
intent requirement in much the same way as Wilson v. Murch:56
To recover for fraudulent representations, it is not necessary that it be
shown the defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity of the facts stated by
him. It is sufficient that he made the representations with the consciousness
that he was without knowledge as to their truth or falsity when in fact, they
were false.57
This state of mind requirement is more properly categorized as reckless-
ness than it is as negligence. Black's Law Dictionary defines recklessness as
"rashness; heedlessness; wanton conduct. The state of mind accompanying an
act, which either pays no regard to its probably or possibly injurious conse-
quences, or which, though foreseeing such consequences, persists in spite of
such knowledge." 58 Recklessness constitutes a higher state of guilt than does
negligence.59 It is a state of mind that courts have been more readily willing to
condemn than mere negligence.6
There is a very fine line between someone speaking when he does not
know the truth and speaking when he knows he does not know the truth. This
distinction is the difference between negligent and reckless conduct. Missouri
courts have not always recognized this distinction. Several recent decisions
state that in order to prevail on a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, a
plaintiff is obliged to prove the following elements: 1) a false, material repre-
sentation; 2) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or his ignorance of its truth;
3) the speaker's intent that it should be acted upon by the hearer in the man-
ner reasonably contemplated; 4) the hearer's ignorance of falsity of the state-
ment; 5) the hearer's reliance on its truth and the right to rely thereon; and 6)
proximate injury.61
54. See, e.g., Smithpeter v. Mid-State Motor Co., 74 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Mo. App.,
W.D. 1934) (a false statement innocently but mistakenly made will not afford a cause
of action).
55. Compare Ackmann v. Keeney-Toelle Real Estate Co., 401 S.W.2d 483, 489
(Mo. 1966) (en banc) (real estate developer erected signs indicating city water hookups
were available with sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding that he knew
hookups were not available) with Koch v. Victoria Loan Co., 652 S.W.2d 212, 216
(Mo. App., E.D. 1983) (seller of house told buyer roofs were in good shape without
actual knowledge).
56. 354 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. App., E.D. 1962).
57. Id. at 338-39.
58. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (5th ed. 1979).
59. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, at § 34, at 213-14.
60. See, e.g., Ackmann v. Keeney-Toelle Real Estate Co. 401 S.W.2d 483, 489
(Mo. 1966) (en banc) (seller recklessly misrepresented model year of tractor).
61. See, e.g., Marler v. House, 637 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982). It
is likely that such short-hand versions of the fraud elements were formulated in cases
that did not involve the subtleties of constructive fraud. Such formulations have been
repeatedly cited by the courts without objection because no objectionable issue was
raised in those cases. By the time cases raising the speaker's conscious knowledge of his
1985] 885
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The second element sets forth the speaker's knowledge requirement. "Ig-
norance of its truth" can reasonably be interpreted to mean recklessness or
negligence. Conceivably, the phrase may even refer to a purely innocent mis-
statement. However, the courts have failed to make the key distinction as to
why the speaker was ignorant of the truth or falsity of his statement. Unfortu-
nately, the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions also fail to recognize the dis-
tinction.62 M.A.I. 23.05, entitled "Verdict Directing-Fraudulent Misrepre-
sentations," states:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant (represented to plaintiff that...) intending that plaintiff
rely on such representation (in purchasing the item, etc.), and
Second, the representation was false, and
Third, defendant did not know whether the representation was true or
false, and
Fourth, the representation was material to the purchase by plaintiff (of
the item), and
Fifth, plaintiff relied on the representation in making the purchase, and
(in so relying plaintiff was using ordinary care care, and)*
Sixth, as a direct result of such representation the plaintiff was damaged.
* used where right to- rely is at issue.63
Paragraph Third of the verdict director allows a jury to find liability for
fraud whenever the speaker is without knowledge of the truth or falsity of his
statement. 64 Once again, lack of knowledge is not limited to recklessness but
could result from mere negligence or innocence. Oddly enough, the commit-
tee's comment to M.A.I. 23.05 cites the exact language from Wilson as sup-
port for the proposition that liability can be imposed for a mere lack of knowl-
edge. 5 The failure of the courts and the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions
to differentiate between recklessness and negligence or innocence has not gone
unnoticed. 66 Even so, the Missouri Supreme Court has made no attempt to
falsity came before the courts, such formulations were the "settled" law. It is difficult
to attack a legal formula that has found its way into countless opening paragraphs in
fraud cases, innumerable headnotes, and now, the Missouri Approved Jury Instruc-
tions. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
62. See M.A.I. 23.05 (1982).
63. M.A.I. 23.05 (1982).
64. Once again there has been a failure to make the distinction as to why the
speaking party was unaware of the falsity of his statement. It is difficult to believe that
the framers of this verdict director failed to recognize this distinction. The wording of
such an instruction is surely the result of proposals, discussion, and argument. Al-
though M.A.I.s supposedly codify existing Missouri case law, it is arguable that in this
instance the drafting committee consciously moved the state toward absolute liability
for innocent or negligent misrepresentations without a judicial mandate to do so.
65. M.A.I. 23.05 comment (1982).
66. See Huttegger v. Davis, 599 S.W.2d 506, 515-16 (Mo. 1980) (Welliver, J.,
dissenting) (M.A.I. verdict director fails to distinguish between fraud and negligence);
see also infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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limit the cases or modify the verdict director.
At any rate, there are at least some Missouri courts that have imposed
fraud liability for negligent misrepresentations.6 7 However, these cases most
often arise in a buyer-seller relationship and amount to a seller being forced to
warrant that he has not misrepresented what he has sold. The idea is not in-
consistent with the modern trend toward products liability and implied war-
ranties that have developed in tort and contract law."'
This expansion of the intent requirement in the law of fraud is the second
basis for the development of negligent misrepresentation. Coverage of negli-
gent misrepresentations through the use of constructive intent in fraud law is
fundamentally different than the concept of a third party beneficiary as it de-
veloped in tort law. First, there is no requirement in fraud that the hearer
prove a duty on the part of the speaker to refrain from acting negligently. This
"due care" requirement is the essence of negligence law.69 Second, the fraud
version of negligent misrepresentation sets no limits on the number of potential
plaintiffs that might reasonably rely on the speaker's statement.70 "Proximate
cause" and "duty to an ascertainable class" limit the number of plaintiffs that
can recover under negligence principles .7 Third, the fraud cause of action is
grounded in contract, and the duties imposed on a speaker are those that can
be implied from the actual intent of the contracting parties.7 2 The duty in
negligence law is imposed as a matter of public policy. It extends only as far
as it would be extended by a hypothetical reasonable man. Parties to a con-
67. See, e.g., Ligon, 581 S.W.2d at 909-10 (shipping foreman negligently mis-
represented weight of machine); see also infra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
68. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 107, at 748.
69. Id. § 30, at 164. Thus, under the tort formulation there is a built-in limita-
tion on the scope of liability. No defendant will be liable to a greater extent than the
reasonable man in the same situation. The lack of any such limitation in the law of
fraud leaves courts with an all or nothing situation. Liability will be either confined to
intentional fraud or extended to the limits of strict responsibility. Id. § 92, at 655.
70. Early on, commentators explained the differing results in Glanzer and UI-
tramares on the basis of the number of potential plaintiffs that could be identified.
Glanzer seemed to say one identifiable plaintiff was enough, but Ultramares stated that
30 was too many. Such distinctions were too simplistic and have given way to a more
refined analysis. See Note, supra note 11, at 469.
71. Proximate cause serves to limit the size of the class that will be able to sue
under negligent misrepresentation to those potential plaintiffs who were foreseeable to
the reasonable man in the shoes of the defendant. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, §
41, at 263. Early interpretations of Glanzer and Ultramares spoke of the "duty only
running to an ascertainable class." Only "reasonably foreseeable" plaintiffs qualified as
an "ascertainable class." Id. § 107, at 747. Such a limitation is now incorporated into
the concept of proximate cause. Moreover, the "reasonably foreseeable" test is now
accepted as the proper means by which to limit the class of potential plaintiffs in negli-
gent misrepresentation suits. Id.
72. Toenjes v. L.J. McNeary Constr. Co., 406 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Mo. App., St.
L. 1966). Contracts exist only to the extent that there is "intent," either actual or
implied. Therefore, only an "intentional" misrepresentation should serve to sever the
contract and allow a cause for damages to the listener.
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tract need not be reasonable so long as both parties agree to its terms.7 3 The
concept of constructive intent in fraud law and the third party beneficiary con-
cept in tort law are simply so different as to defy locating a clean seam where
their fabrics overlap.
IV. SECTION 552 OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
The framers of the Restatement (Second) of Torts were confronted with a
wide variety of divergent theories and conflicting cases which attempted to
impose liability for negligent misrepresentations. They were able to strike a
balance between negligence and fraud and the duties owed to receivers of false
information. The result of their efforts is section 552.7"
The general rule of liability is contained in the opening paragraph:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false in-
formation for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject
to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in ob-
taining or communicating the information."
This section applies to both the professional suppliers of information, who
were the subject of the collapse of the privity rule in negligence cases, and the
seller of goods, a common suspect in fraud cases due to his pecuniary interest
in the transaction. Liability is limited to representations that the hearer could
justifiably rely upon.7 6 This "right to rely" is not only an express element of
fraud" but also relates to the concept of contributory negligence under a
purely negligence based formulation.7 8 Finally, the speaker's state of mind is
limited to "failure to exercise reasonable care,"79 a negligence standard which
does not encompass liability for purely innocent mistakes.8"
Though the first subsection of section 552 defines liability, it sets no
73. Thacker v. Massman Constr. Co., 247 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Mo. 1952). In
essence, parties are allowed to make irrational agreements as long as they know the
agreement is irrational. By contrast, parties who are not given the correct facts cannot
know of the wisdom of their decisions until after something goes wrong. Society is slow
to place a loss on an injured party when another party's negligence caused the injury.
However, when both parties are equally innoceqt, the practice has been for the courts
to leave the parties as it found them. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 107, at 748.
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1976).
76. See id. comment a.
77. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
78. See also infra note 155 concerning the continued importance of contribu-
tory negligence even in comparative fault states.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1976).
80. Even though § 552 imposes no monetary liability for a purely innocent mis-
take, courts of equity may continue to allow rescission for innocent mistakes. Nothing
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boundaries on the scope of coverage. Subsections (2) and (3) attempt to enu-
merate those parties that will be allowed to bring suit for negligent
misrepresentation:
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit
and guidance he intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the informa-
tion to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially
similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the
duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect
them.8 1
Subsection (2)(a) is consistent with the logic of Ultrameres in that it lim-
its liability to the foreseeable plaintiff.8 2 The "spectre of unlimited liability"8 "
is thus kept safely in its bottle. This formulation limits the liability of a seller
to his immediate buyer or to one who the buyer has informed him will be the
beneficiary of such information.'
Subsection (2)(b) further limits the scope of liability to the transaction in
which the information was supplied.85 Thus a surveyor who negligently per-
forms a survey need not worry of liability to purchasers of the land beyond
that for which he supplied the survey. Nor need a seller of an automobile be
concerned that a purchaser, several steps removed from his sale, might hold
him accountable for a misrepresentation that he made to a purchaser years
earlier. 86
Subsection (3) is self-explanatory and the product of other misrepresenta-
tion problems involving public officials. When the duty is specifically expressed
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 552(2), (3) (1976).
82. The plaintiff is free to expand the class to any size by informing the mis-
representer of the large group to which he intends to supply the information. Even if
that large group becomes potential plaintiffs, they can become actual plaintiffs only by
being injured "by reason of" the misrepresentation. If the risk of liability remains too
high for the information give, he can serve to insure himself by demanding compensa-
tion commensurate with the greater risk.
83. Judge Cardozo created this phrase himself by repeatedly adverting to the
problem of ruinous consequences for a defendant who was guilty of nothing more than
negligence. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372,
400 (1939). It is a concept that refuses to die. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2,
at 107, at 747.
84. Subsection (2)(a) most likely limits the class of potential plaintiffs to those
in existence at the time the agreement or transaction was entered into. See Note, supra
note 41, at 1187.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(b) (1976).
86. Sales of land must be in writing to be enforceable under the Statute of
Frauds. Mo. REV. STAT. § 432.010 (1952). As such, the death of the misrepresentating
party should end any cause of action based on a land sales contract.
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in a statute or ordinance, the scope of liability is likewise limited to the group
for which the statute was written.
8 7
V. ADOPTION OF SECTION 552 IN MISSOURI
Since Aluma Kraft in 1973, Missouri has moved slowly but significantly
towards the adoption of section 552 as the formulation for a negligent misrep-
resentation cause of action. The number of cases on point is limited, and al-
though Missouri courts have recognized section 552, they have not been overly
zealous in exploring its full ramifications. For five years after Alma Kraft no
reported Missouri decision mentioned section 552. Then, in 1978, the Court of
Appeals for the Western District refused to apply section 552 to plaintiff's
cause of action in J. Louis Crum Corp. v. Alfred Lindgren, Inc.,8 8 finding that
there had been no actual misrepresentation. 9
However, the court did explain that cases that come to the type of result
reached in Aluma Kraft are the basis of section 552.90 The court pointed out
that liability in such cases has been imposed in three situations: first, where
the negligent actor has knowledge of the specific injured party's reliance; 91
second, where the plaintiff is a member of a group that the negligent actor
seeks to influence;92 and third, where the negligent actor has special reason to
know that some member of a limited group will rely on the information mis-
represented. 3 The court added that other courts have denied recovery in this
last category of cases. 94 No Missouri court had yet directly adopted section
552.
In 1979, the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District held that liability
could result based on section 552 of the Restatement. In Ligon Specialized
Hauler v. Inland Container Corp.,9 5 the court found that the plaintiff made a
submissible case against a seller of a die cutting machine for negligently un-
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment k, illustrations 16-
18 (1976).
88. 564 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978).
89. Id. at 551.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Aluma Kraft, 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App., St. L. 1973)); see
note 34 and accompanying text.
92. Lindgren, 564 S.W.2d at 551 (citing Granberg v. Turnham, 166 Cal. App.
2d 390, 333 P.2d 423 (1958) (real estate broker acting on behalf of third party negli-
gently acquired land subject to zoning restrictions)).
93. Lindgren, 564 S.W.2d at 551 (citing M. Miller Co. v. Domes & Moore, 198
Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961) (plaintiff contractor allowed recovery
against soil engineer for report negligently done for city on which plaintiff relied in
computing bid)).
94. Lindgren, 564 S.W.2d at 551 (citing Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chat-
tanooga, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964) (plaintiff subcontractor cannot recover against
engineer who designed city's sewage system when negligently made drawings induced
plaintiff to underestimate cost of completion in bid)).
95. 581 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979).
890 [Vol. 50
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 4 [1985], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/8
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
derstating the weight of the machine. Plaintiff, a hauling company hired by
the purchaser, relied on the representation by attempting to haul the machine
on a truck too small for its size. The machine broke its chains, fell from the
truck and was damaged. Plaintiff sued for the expenses which resulted from
the damage to the machine.9 The court looked to section 552 in order to ob-
tain an equitable result for the plaintiff.97 The court hypothesized a duty on
the part of the seller to use due care in making weight representations because
of the commercial nature of the transaction and the reasonableness of plain-
tiff's reliance on a statement made by a professional in that area." In Ligon,
the court was well on it way to adopting the Restatement version of negligent
misrepresentation.
Approximately one year later, the Missouri Supreme Court distinguished
between an action based on intentional fraudulent misrepresentation and one
based on negligent representation in Huttegger v. Davis.99 A real estate seller
misrepresented the fact that the purchasers would be able to procure a water
hook-up from the local water district. The trial court and, ultimately, the su-
preme court found that plaintiffs had limited their pleadings and evidence to a
cause of action based on intentional fraudulent misrepresentation. On appeal,
however, plaintiffs modified their argument to meet the requirements of negli-
gent misrepresentation. 100 In recognizing the difference between the two theo-
ries, the court pointed to Ligon as an example of negligent misrepresenta-
tion.' 0' Judge Welliver dissented from the court's opinion and stated that the
time was ripe for the court to recognize a cause of action for negligent misrep-
resentation.10 2 Moreover, Judge Welliver urged that the court's adoption of the
cause of action be based on section 552 of the Restatement.10 3
Subsequently, in 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District
again recognized its adoption of a negligent misrepresentation cause of action
in Springdale Gardens, Inc. v. Countryland Development.'0 In this case, how-
ever, the court ruled that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of producing evi-
dence necessary to make out a cause of action as recognized in Ligon.10 5 The
96. Id. at 907. Section 311 of the Restatement, relating to physical damage or
injury, would probably have been more proper under the circumstances. Plaintiff, how-
ever, limited their damages only to the resultant pecuniary loss. Id. at 908. Section 311
states: "One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such
information." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 311 (1976).
97. 581 S.W.2d at 909-10.
98. Id.
99. 599 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
100. Id. at 512.
101. See id. at 512 n.4.
102. Id. at 513-16 (Welliver, J., dissenting). Judge Welliver argued that the
plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their pleadings and retry the case. Id. at 514
(Welliver, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 515 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
104. 638 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
105. Id. at 816. In Springdale, a purchaser of real estate brought an action
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Court of Appeals for the Western District followed the Eastern District's lead
in Chubb Group of Insurance Cos. v. C.F. Murphy & Associates,0 8 decided
in 1983. The court ruled that plaintiffs properly pleaded a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation within the narrow limitations of section 552 and
so overruled the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants.1 0 7
It is this unsettled state of affairs that confronts the legal practitioner in
Missouri. The Missouri Supreme Court has yet to officially sanction the adop-
tion of section 552, although it appears as if it will when presented with the
proper case.10 8 Since the only direct holdings on point are the result of over-
turning summary judgments,109 the courts have not enunciated how negligent-
misrepresentation is to be pleaded and proved at trial. Hopefully, the Missouri
Supreme Court will follow section 552, along with the comments and cited
authority in that section, to fashion a negligent misrepresentation cause of ac-
tion that will comport with Missouri jurisprudence."'
It is important that the courts be willing to adopt section 552 in its en-
tirety, including the logical extensions that flow from it. Section 552 is the
result of a neatly crafted compromise. It attempts to provide a remedy for an
injury which the case law clearly shows needs to be addressed. At the same
time, it seeks to limit the scope of that remedy for the protection of merely
negligent parties."' The compromise will be ineffectual if the recent develop-
against a realty company and the seller to recover additional surveying expenses in-
curred because a plat provided by seller indicated that the land could be divided into
171 lots when the actual number was 165. The court pointed out that "[i]n the present
case, the only evidence of negligence presented was on the part of the engineer who
prepared the Rowland Survey." Id. at 816. The surveyor was not a party to the suit.
Had he been, it appears as if his negligence would have fallen squarely within the
coverage of § 552 as interpreted by the court. See id.
106. 656 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
107. Id. at 783-85.
108.' This presumption is based on the court's favorable reference to Ligon in
Huttegger. See supra note 101.
109. See Chubb Group, 656 S.W.2d at 769; Ligon, 581 S.W.2d at 907.
110. The court must take special care in reading the comments and illustrations
of § 552. The actual wording of the section is arguably less limited than the constraints
placed on it by the comments. The illustrations generally involve businessmen who
make misrepresentations in the course of their business dealings. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 illustrations 1-12. A seller, not ordinarily in the business of
selling, could fall within the scope of a literal interpretation of § 552 because he has
realized a pecuniary gain. Some commentators have argued that a commercial gloss
should be read into § 552. See Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to
Third Parties, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 838 (1977). That suggestion has not been fol-
lowed by all courts, however, and at least the potential exists for applying § 552 to all
sales transactions, although some discount that potential. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 2, § 107, at 747.
1l1. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. Negligent parties- are not
"bad guys" to the extent that intentional defrauders are. Section 552 makes such negli-
gent parties pay for the immediate damage that their negligence has caused but not for
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ment in fraud law that blurs the distinction between intent and recklessness on
the one hand and negligence and strict liability on the other continues to
persist.11 2
The duty imposed by section 552 arises from the relationship between the
parties. In trying to determine whether or not a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation lies, the inquiry should be one directed to the nature of the
services provided by the person making the representations and the relation-
ship he has with the relying party. If the person provides services requiring
special competence (as in the case of professional suppliers of information), or
if he is in the position of one with unique information (as in the case of a party
selling his own home), he should be held to the standard of competence com-
mensurate with his position. It is this special competence that has attracted
those who deal with such a person. The law should impose upon him the af-
firmative duty, arising out of the relationship between himself and the party to
whom he speaks, to exercise care and diligence in the representations he
makes. 113 The relationship between a buyer and a seller is not necessarily such
a relationship.
An investigation of the case law indicates that courts have provided a
remedy for negligent misrepresentation principally against those who advise in
an essentially non-adversarial capacity.1 1 4 On the other hand, in the case of
presumed antagonists, the tendency of most courts has been either to rely on
fraud with the requirement of scienter or to impose strict liability.11 5
Fraud actions should be limited to those covered by actual intent or reck-
lessness.11 6 It seems clear that a party buying a 1972 Chevrolet from a shifty
112. See supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text. Section 552 takes great
pains to limit its liability to the scope of the negligence tort action. If plaintiffs could
resort to the Missouri common law of fraud, relying on constructive fraud to bring
about absolute liability, then little would be left of § 552.
113. See Note, Misrepresentation in Indiana: What Hath Fraud Wrought?, 53
IND. L.J. 559, 567 (1977-78).
114. See James, Misrepresentation-Part I, 37 MD. L. REV. 286, 313 (1977).
115. Id. In the dozen or so states that purport to have adopted a cause of action
similar to that of § 552, there are a few cases which appear to impose a duty of reason-
able care in a simple buyer-seller relationship. See, e.g., Hardy v. Carmichael, 207 Cal.
App. 2d 218, 24 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962). These cases, however, can usually be explained
away by the fact that they were either mischaracterized as sounding in negligence,
when in fact they sounded in fraud, or the discussion of negligent misrepresentation
was unnecessary and confused dicta. This, however, is not always the case. See Ligon,
581 S.W.2d at 908 (seller's foreman misrepresents weight of machine); Jasper Aviation
v. McCollum Aviation, 497 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1972) (private seller of a helicopter
could be liable for negligent misrepresentations); Susser Petroleum Co. v. Latina Oil
Corp., 574 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (oil company liable for negligently mis-
representing the quantity of fuel which it would have available to ship to plaintiff); see
also supra note 95 and accompanying text.
116. Actual intent or recklessness has been the traditional basis for the deceit
cause of action since Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337 (1880). The expansion of the deceit
cause of action to include negligent or innocent misrepresentations was either inadver-
tent or not well reasoned. Other theories for imposing liability for less than reckless
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used-car salesman is in a different situation than is a businessman who hires
an accounting firm to determine the book value of his stock in a corporation.1 1 7
This common sense idea is not new. An article on the scope of deceit written
by Professor Green, which is now over fifty years old, is still timely:
While caveat emptor no longer controls, it must be recognized that the
interests of parties to business transactions are naturally adverse, since each is
vying for the most advantageous position at the other's expense. The relation-
ship between the two parties permits a plaintiff, exercising the minimum cau-
tion the law requires, to expect honesty and non-reckless behavior from the
defendant, but no more. Plaintiff may not rely on the competence of defend-
ant and a fortiori may not rely upon the information imparted as being war-
ranted or accurate.118
It follows that the terms of section 552 should be the sole method of stating a
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation in Missouri. Inconsistent liabil-
ity for negligence under the fraud requirements will serve only to undermine
the delicate balance established by section 552.119
This is not to say that section 552 is applicable only to cases involving a
third party in the business of supplying information. For instance, in Ligon,
the seller who negligently misstated the weight of the die cutting machine was
not in the business of supplying such information.1 20 The seller and the hauler
were brought together in a business context for their mutual benefit. The
hauler was not in a position adverse to the seller. He had no reason to doubt
the truth of the representation made by the shipping foreman. Liability under
section 552 was applicable because of the nature of the relationship between
the parties.121 Ligon is the only reported Missouri case which correctly applies
behavior are now available in §§ 552 and 552C. The advantages in keeping such con-
cepts analytically separate from fraud and deceit far outweigh the disadvantages en-
compassed in the need to retreat and clarify past ambiguous decisions.
117. Jurisdictions that have adopted a cause of action for negligent misrepresen-
tation have invoked it primarily against defendants in the business of giving informa-
tion or advice to the general public. See Arizona Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. O'Malley
Lumber Co., 14 Ariz. App. 486, 484 P.2d 639 (1971) (title company); Kovaleski v.
Tallahassee Title Co., 363 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (abstractor); Ryan v.
Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) (certified public accountant); Bonhiver v. Graff,
311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976) (accountant); Stotlar v. Hester, 92 N.M. 26,
582 P.2d 403 (1978) (appraiser); Neff v. Bud Lewis Co., 89 N.M. 145, 548 P.2d 107
(1976) (real estate broker); Banker's Trust Co. v. Steenburn, 95 Misc. 2d 967, 409
N.Y.S.2d 51 (1978) (banker); Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins., 471 Pa. 404, 370 A.2d
366 (1977) (insurance agent); Isaacs v. Bokor, 566 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1978) (builder);
Tartera v. Palumba, 453 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. 1970) (surveyor); Shatterproof Glass
Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. 1971) (auditor); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1980) (realtor); Rogers v. City of Toppeish, 23 Wash. 2d 554, 596 P.2d 1096
(1979) (city zoning official); Wilber v. Western Properties, 22 Wash. 2d 458, 589 P.2d
1273 (Wash. App. 1979) (city administrator).
118. Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REV. 749 (1930).
119. See supra note 112.
120. See Ligon, 581 S.W.2d at 909.
121. Ligon, 581 S.W.2d at 910. This relationship was, in fact, a business rela-
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section 552 to a situation it was intended to preempt from fraud law.122 In
fact, Ligon is one of the few reported cases that makes this application under
section 552.123 The plaintiff in Ligon was given a remedy under the Restate-
ment formulation of negligent misrepresentation even though he would proba-
bly not have found recourse under the constructive fraud concept or as a third
party beneficiary.
VI. IN MISSOURI PRACTICE
As the prior discussion indicates, Missouri and many other states are in a
transitional state regarding application of negligent misrepresentation as an
actionable theory of recovery. Much of the existing fraud machinery will have
to be retooled in order to handle negligent misrepresentation. So too, many of
the options that might be included will have to be carefully chosen and incor-
porated into the framework. In the near future the courts will be forced to
address needed changes in the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions and the
effect of negligent misrepresentation on comparative fault and contributory
negligence.
A. M.A.L Verdict Director
M.A.I. 23.05, the verdict director for fraudulent misrepresentations, 124
can now be read to impose liability for negligent and innocent misrepresenta-
tions as well as for intentional fraud. In his dissent in Huttegger v. Davis,125
Judge Welliver pointed out the problem and its simple solution:
Paragraph third of M.A.I. 23.05 permits recovery for fraudulent misrep-
resentation if the jury believes that "defendant did not know whether the rep-
resentation was true or false." More properly, the instruction should express
the requirement that the defendant made a false representation "with the
tionship, not a contractual one. The seller had nothing to gain by misrepresenting the
weight of the die cutter. The seller's shipping foreman had conferred with the seller's
master mechanic before ordering the flatbed truck. Id. at 909. The hauler was thus
justified in deferring to the opinion of the seller.
122. As discussed previously, the extent of recovery for pecuniary loss has gener-
ally been bounded by the contract. See supra notes 3 and 25 and accompanying text. It
is in cases like Ligon, where no contractual relationship is present, that § 552 has novel
application. If application of § 552 is limited to scenarios requiring privity, then the
law of contracts adequately preempts § 552, which consequently becomes no more than
meaningless surplusage. To the extent that an adverse seller must warrant the complete
accuracy of his statements, the case law arguably goes too far. See notes 54-66 and
accompanying text. Section 552 balances these two extremes.
123. Few cases have focused on negligent misrepresentation as set forth in § 552.
As yet, decisions under § 552 applicable to non-professional suppliers of information
are relatively few. See note 115 supra.
124. See note 63 and accompanying text.
125. Huttegger, 599 S.W.2d at 513-16 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
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consciousness that he was without knowledge as to their truth or falsity."' 28
Judge Welliver's suggested change in the verdict director would accom-
plish three important goals. First, it would distinctly separate fraud liability
from negligent misrepresentation liability. Further, it would eliminate the pos-
sibility that a seller would be strictly responsible for misrepresentations made
when he deals with a buyer in a bargaining position equal to his own. 127 Sec-
ond, the proposed change would reintroduce the scienter requirement into a
fraud cause of action. Scienter implies a guilty knowledge or a guilty lack of
knowledge on the part of the tort-feasor.' 28 Consequently, the misrepresenta-
tion would have to be made with an intent to deceive or with recklessness.
Thus, this change would limit the scope of fraud coverage to that area fraud
has traditionally occupied. 2 9
Third, and most important, the change in the verdict director would elim-
inate the possibility of imposing punitive damages for merely negligent or in-
nocent mistakes. 30 Missouri courts authorize the award of punitive damages
upon a showing of fraud.13' Punitive damages are justified in situations where
a defendant intentionally or recklessly harms a plaintiff because of the pre-
sumed existence of moral guilt." 2 However, punitive damages are seldom jus-
tified in cases of negligence. They are even less justified when the speaker
126. Id. at 516 n.4 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
127. A mere lack of knowledge without culpability based on scienter would not
be covered by fraud or negligence but might still fall within a contractual warranty.
128. See, e.g., Dudley v. Dumont, 526 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975)
(thorough discussion of scienter requirement in Missouri).
129. Green, supra note 113, at 751. Though that article was written in 1930, it
remains one of the most analytically sound treatments of the tort of deceit ever written.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 107, at 741.
130. See M.A.I. 10.04 (exemplary damage instruction). Judge Welliver, in his
Huttegger dissent, pointed out that plaintiffs had limited their cause of action to inten-
tional fraud "in an effort to preserve their award of punitive damages." 599 S.W.2d at
514. If negligent misrepresentation under § 552 is encompassed by both the common
law areas of fraud and negligence, then a plaintiff, wishing to maximize his or her
recovery through the imposition of punitive damages, will always plead fraud. As long
as the fraud verdict director fails to distinguish between intentional and constructive
fraud, a finding of fraud pursuant to M.A.I. 23.05 holds out the possibility of punitive
damages based on mere negligence. Ackmann v. Keeney-Toelle Real Estate Co., 401
S.W.2d 483, 486 (Mo. 1966) (en banc).
131. Id. Courts typically impose punitive damages only in instances in which a
plaintiff produces evidence that the defendant "maliciously, willfully, intentionally, or
recklessly injured the prospective purchasers." Franta v. Hodge, 302 S.W.2d 291, 294
(Mo. App., K.C. 1957). These states of mind satisfy the traditional scienter require-
ments for fraud and the case law is replete with examples of the short-hand statement
that punitives are authorized upon a showing of fraud. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Woodson,
328 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1959); Brown v. Sloan's Moving & Storage Co., 296 S.W.2d 20
(Mo. 1956).
132. Punitive damages are imposed to punish a defendant whose actions are wor-
thy of retribution. "Recklessness" is a gross deviation of the standard of care required
of citizens in a free society. The courts have declared such flagrant disregard of dam-
ages blameworthy. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 34, at 213.
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makes a purely innocent mistake.3
The present verdict director does not make a distinction between fraud
that is malicious or reckless and fraud that is only negligent or innocent. If a
jury returns a verdict in favor of a plaintiff on the ground of fraud, a judge
would be unable to determine whether the jury found sufficient scienter to
merit punitive damages. Punitive damages would not be available based upon
the proposed negligent misrepresentation verdict director. 1 3
B. M.A.L Damages Instruction
Damages for misrepresentation of property are covered by Missouri Ap-
proved Jury Instruction 4.03.135 It states:
If you find in favor of the plaintiff then you must award plaintiff such
sum as you believe was the difference between the actual value of the (de-
scribed property) on the date it was sold to plaintiff and what its value would
have been on that date had (described property) been as represented by
defendant. 138
The instruction correctly states the measure of damages for intentionally
fraudulent misrepresentation, but may be inadequate for the measure of dam-
ages for liability based on negligence.
The measure of damages set forth in M.A.I. 4.03 is referred to as the
"benefit-of-the-bargain" approach.13 7 The plaintiff is awarded damages in an
amount that would put him in a position he would have been in had all the
representations been true.3 8 Another measure of damages applied in misrepre-
133. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1976) indicates that puni-
tive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, that is a product of the
defendant's evil motive, or that is a product of his reckless indifference to the rights of
others. Id. Other jurisdictions recognize that not all types of fraud justify punitive
damages. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Hoffschneider, 297 N.W.2d 210, 215 (Iowa 1980) ("or-
dinary" or "simple" fraud was not enough to impose punitive damages); see also An-
not., 19 A.L.R.4th 792 (1983).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 552B (1976) limits damages to out-of-
pocket losses. It makes no provision for punitive damages, either specifically or analyti-
cally. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
135. M.A.I. 4.03 (1969).
136. This instruction was new in 1969 and has remained unchanged. At the time
the instruction was written, the acceptance of § 552 in Missouri was uncertain. The
need for a new damage instruction may not become obvious until the distinction be-
tween intentional and constructive fraud is clarified by the introduction of a new ver-
dict director.
137. The majority of jurisdictions, including Missouri, follow the benefit-of-the-
bargain measure of damages in fraud cases. See Smith v. Tracy, 372 S.W.2d 925 (Mo.
1963); Kendrick v. Ryus, 225 Mo. 150, 123 S.W. 937 (1910); Cotner v. Blinne, 623
S.W.2d 615 (Mo. App., S.D. 1981); see also 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages, §§ 80-83
(1965); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 875 (1967).
138. For example, had plaintiff been told that land he was buying contained 100
acres of marketable logging timber, when in fact there was none, plaintiff would be
able to recover the value of 100 acres of logging timber land even if he paid less than
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sentation cases is called the "out-of-pocket" approach. This approach awards
the plaintiff the difference between the value of what he has parted with and
the value of what he has received. If what he received is worth what he paid
for it, he has not been damaged and therefore can not recover. 39
As a matter of the strict logic of the tort form of action, the "out-of-
pocket" measure of damages is the more consistent with the purpose of tort
remedies. In tort actions the general rule allows recovery only for actual and
direct, or "proximate" losses occasioned by a defendant's wrongful act; there
can be no recovery for remote or speculative damages. Out-of-pocket damages
are the traditional measure of recovery in tort suits. 4 0
On the other hand, it is urged in support of benefit-of-the-bargain rule
that the form of the action should be of little importance. In an action in the
form of tort for breach of warranty the plaintiff is given the benefit of his
bargain and the addition of an allegation of intent to deceive should certainly
not decrease his recovery. In many cases the out-of-pocket measure will permit
the fraudulent defendant to escape all liability and have a chance to profit by
the transaction if he can get away with it."'4
Missouri has generally followed the majority of jurisdictions in applying
the benefit-of-the-bargain rule. In cases of intentional or reckless misrepresen-
tation, damages are fairly easily ascertained under M.A.I. 4.03. Missouri
courts have had difficulty, however, when the cause of action is based on some-
thing less than intent or recklessness. 4 ' Prosser has indicated that the choice
between measures of damages has been particularly troublesome in negligent
misrepresentation cases. 1 43
The drafters of section 552 were acutely aware of the measure of dam-
ages problem and saw fit to add a section on its proper resolution. Section
552B of the Restatement states that damages for fraudulent misrepresentation
should be limited to out-of-pocket damages. 14 It would permit plaintiff the
that amount for his property. See, e.g., Miller v. Higgins, 452 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1970).
139. See, e.g., Budd v. Budd, 97 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. App., Spr. 1936) (difference
between value of stock purchased and parted with is proper measure of damages).
Under the out-of-pocket approach, the plaintiff who thinks he is buying 100 acres of
logging timber could recover only the difference between the value of his 100 acres and
what he paid for it, even if a single tree were not on the property.
140. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 105, at 734-35.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Central Microfilm Serv. Corp. v. Basic/Four Corp., 688 F.2d
1206 (8th Cir. 1982) (apparently applying Missouri law, court permitted an alternative
measure to the benefit-of-the-bargain because of the peculiar circumstances of the
case), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1191 (1983); Fong v. Town & Country Estates, Inc., 600
F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1979) (court indicated that benefit-of-the-bargain rule applies to
damages, but if plaintiff seeks rescission, out-of-pocket rule applies), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 298 (1979); Lindberg Cadillac Co. v. Aron, 371 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Mo. App., St.
L. 1963) (cost of making repairs to a cracked engine-block was the proper measure of
damages since it went to the value of the car as represented and its actual value).
143. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 105, at 734.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B (1976).
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(a) the difference between the value of what he has received in the trans-
action and its purchase price or other value given for it; and
(b) pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the plaintiff's
reliance upon the misrepresentation.
(2) The damages recoverable for a negligent misrepresentation do not
include the benefit of the plaintiff's contract with the defendant.1'"
Comment (b) to section 552 explains the rationale behind the different
treatment given to damages for fraudulent misrepresentation. It indicates that
the policy considerations that have led the courts to compensate the plaintiff
for the loss of his bargain stem from the belief that the deception of a deliber-
ate defrauder should not be profitable to him. Such considerations do not ap-
ply when the defendant has had honest intentions but has merely failed to
exercise reasonable care in what he says or does. 46
M.A.I. 4.03 was written prior to the recognition of negligent misrepresen-
tation in Missouri. Consequently, the adoption of a negligent misrepresenta-
tion cause of action has left the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions inade-
quate to handle the situation. A new damage instruction, awarding out-of-
pocket damages should be substituted for M.A.I. 4.03 in the case of negligent
misrepresentations.147
C. Comparative Fault and Contributory Negligence Applied to Negligent
Misrepresentation
The final area that needs to be explored is the effect that comparative
fault and contributory negligence will have on a cause of action based on neg-
ligent misrepresentation. 14 Until recently, contributory negligence was a com-
plete bar to any charge of primary negligence by a defendant in Missouri. The
bar included negligence resulting in physical or pecuniary damage. In Gustaf-
son v. Benda,'49 however, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted a system of
pure comparative fault based on the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.150
Application of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act is confined to physical
145. Id.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B comment b (1976).
147. A possible new instruction could read:
If you find in favor of the plaintiff then you must award plaintiff such
sum as you believe was the difference between the actual value of the (de-
scribe property) on the date it was sold to plaintiff and the value of the con-
sideration given by plaintiff in exchange for the (describe property).
148. Comparative fault is the process of allocating damages between negligent
parties. In practice it serves to reduce a plaintiff's damages if he has been guilty of
negligence that contributed to his injury. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 67, at
470. Contributory negligence is a long standing doctrine denying recovery on behalf of
a plaintiff who contributed to his own injury. Id. at 451.
149. 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en bane).
150. Id. at 16. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT (1979).
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harm to persons or property. 151 It specifically states that the Act was not in-
tended to include matters like economic loss resulting from a tort such as neg-
ligent misrepresentation. 152 The comment to section 1 goes on to state that
"failure to include these harms specifically in the act is not intended to pre-
clude application of the general principal to them if a court determines that
the common law of the state would make the application."'' 5 3 The exact mean-
ing of the quoted part of this comment is not clear. It has been suggested that
the comment merely means that if a comparative fault state had been apply-
ing comparative fault to cases of economic loss before the adoption of the Uni-
form Act, adoption of the Act was not intended to change that common law.
54
Since Missouri was not a comparative fault state prior to adoption of the
Act, it is unlikely that Missouri courts would apply comparative fault to negli-
gence based torts causing only pecuniary loss. To the extent that the Act does
not change the common law in the area of negligent misrepresentation, con-
tributory negligence should remain a complete bar to a plaintiff's cause of
action.155
It might come as a shock to Missouri attorneys that contributory negli-
gence is still alive and well following the adoption of a system of pure compar-
ative fault. Exactly what will constitute contributory negligence under negli-
gent misrepresentation is left to the courts and the unique facts of each case.
151. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 comment (1979). The comment fur-
ther states:
The Act does not include intentional torts. Statutes and decisions have
not applied the comparative fault principle to them. But a court determining
that general principle should apply at common law to a case before it of an




154. Id. The suggestion has been made to the author while discussing the effect
of the Act with several Missouri practioners. This interpretation is logical, but begs the
question as to why the commission did not directly state its meaning as it did in the
case of intentional torts. See supra note 148.
155. See Note, Torts-Comparative Negligence: Action for Wanton and Willful
Conduct is Beyond Purview of New Jersey Comparative Negligence Statute, 8 RUT.
CAM. L.J. 376, 379 (1977). The policy considerations which prevent negligence from
barring a cause of action for intentional fraud do not apply in the case of negligent
misrepresentation. Since no one party is more at fault than another, the plaintiff is held
to the standard of care, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment of a reasonable man,
even though he does not possess the qualities necessary to enable him to conform to
that standard. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A comment a (1976); accord
McElroy v. Boise Cascade Corp., 632 S.W.2d 127 (Tenn. 1982) (even though manu-
facturer's recommendation of contractor to erect plaintiff's prefabricated home was
negligent, plaintiff's action in hiring him was contributorily negligent and barred recov-
ery); Zack Cheek Builders v. McLeod, 597 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Tenn. 1980) (court up-
held jury finding that a house builder had made negligent misrepresentations that the
house, built on a hill of fill material, was safe but denied plaintiff relief because of
contributory negligence); see also supra note 5 for additional cases.
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What is important to practitioners is that they recognize the potential hurdle
or saving defense posed by contributory negligence in the case of torts result-
ing in pecuniary loss. 156
VII. CONCLUSION
It seems clear that the Missouri Supreme Court will follow the lead of the
Eastern and Western District Courts of Appeals and recognize a cause of ac-
tion for negligent misrepresentation based on section 552 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.1 57 Its adoption will require some minor changes in the
M.A.I.s as well as the recognition that comparative fault is inapplicable,
whereas contributory negligence probably still is applicable. 158
All in all, the adoption of section 552 of the Restatement is a positive step
for Missouri jurisprudence. It represents a coherent balance in the conflict that
had developed in the law between intentional fraud and the theory of negli-
gence. It establishes a remedy for a wide variety of business related injuries
that continue to change and develop as our society and relationships change
and develop. It establishes a duty to use care in dealing with those persons
who justifiably rely on others for information, yet it limits liability on the part
of the negligent party to a fair and equitable standard.
Negligent misrepresentation gives the practitioner in Missouri a new tool
with which to work. As with most judicial tools, it can be used to hammer
away at the thorns of unfairness and inequality, or it can be used to help mold
the cause of justice in Missouri for years to come. It has been said that a
craftsman is only as good as his tools. We should remember that tools, by
themselves, can do nothing. They are only as good as the craftsman that puts
them to use.
KEVIN SCHNURBUSCH
156. It appears that courts in the future are free to apply comparative fault to
torts causing only pecuniary damage regardless of the adoption of the Uniform Act. A
practitioner might still want to argue for comparison of fault under negligent misrepre-
sentation as a logical development in the common law of pecuniary torts.
157. See supra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 124-56 and accompanying text.
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